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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a scenario where a source node wishes to broadcast two confidential messages to two receivers,
while a wire-tapper also receives the transmitted signal. This model is motivated by wireless communications, where individual
secure messages are broadcast over open media and can be received by any illegitimate receiver. The secrecy level is measured
by the equivocation rate at the eavesdropper. We first study the general (non-degraded) broadcast channel with an eavesdropper.
We present an inner bound on the secrecy capacity region for this model. This inner bound is based on a combination of random
binning, and the Gelfand-Pinsker binning. We further study the situation in which the channels are degraded. For the degraded
broadcast channel with an eavesdropper, we present the secrecy capacity region. Our achievable coding scheme is based on
Cover’s superposition scheme and random binning. We refer to this scheme as the Secret Superposition Scheme. Our converse
proof is based on a combination of the converse proof of the conventional degraded broadcast channel and Csiszar Lemma. We
then assume that the channels are Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) and show that the Secret Superposition Scheme with
Gaussian codebook is optimal. The converse proof is based on Costa’s entropy power inequality. Finally, we use a broadcast
strategy for the slowly fading wire-tap channel when only the eavesdropper’s channel is fixed and known at the transmitter. We
derive the optimum power allocation for the coding layers, which maximizes the total average rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information theoretic secrecy in communication systems was first introduced by Shannon in [1]. The information
theoretic secrecy requires that the received signal of the eavesdropper does not provide any information about the transmitted
messages. Shannon considered a pessimistic situation where both the intended receiver and the eavesdropper have direct access
to the transmitted signal (which is called ciphertext). Under these circumstances, he proved a negative result showing that perfect
secrecy can be achieved only when the entropy of the secret key is greater than, or equal to, the entropy of the message. In
modern cryptography, all practical cryptosystems are based on Shannnon’s pessimistic assumption. Due to practical constraints,
secret keys are much shorter than messages; therefore, these practical cryptosystems are theoretically susceptible to breaking by
attackers. The goal of designing such practical ciphers, however, is to guarantee that no efficient algorithm exists for breaking
them.
Wyner in [2] showed that the above negative result is a consequence of Shannon’s restrictive assumption that the adversary
has access to precisely the same information as the legitimate receiver. Wyner considered a scenario in which a wire-tapper
receives the transmitted signal over a degraded channel with respect to the legitimate receiver’s channel. He further assumed
that the wire-tapper has no computational limitations and knows the codebook used by the transmitter. He measured the
level of ignorance at the eavesdropper by its equivocation and characterized the capacity-equivocation region. Interestingly, a
non-negative perfect secrecy capacity is always achievable for this scenario.
The secrecy capacity for the Gaussian wire-tap channel is characterized by Leung-Yan-Cheong in [3]. Wyner’s work is
then extended to the general (non-degraded) broadcast channel with confidential messages by Csiszar and Korner [4]. They
considered transmitting confidential information to the legitimate receiver while transmitting common information to both the
legitimate receiver and the wire-tapper. They established a capacity-equivocation region for this channel. The BCC has recently
been further studied in [5]–[7], where the source node transmits a common message to both receivers, along with two additional
confidential messages, each aimed at one of the two receivers. Here, the confidentiality of each message is measured with
respect to the other user, and there is no external eavesdropper.
The fading wire-tap channel is investigated in [8] where the source-to destination channel and the source-to-eavesdropper
channel are corrupted by multiplicative fading gain coefficients, in addition to additive white Gaussian noise. In this work,
channels are fast fading and the Channel State Information (CSI) of the legitimate receiver is available at the transmitter. The
perfect secrecy capacity is derived for two different scenarios regarding the availability of the eavesdropper’s CSI. Moreover,
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2the optimal power control policy is obtained for the different scenarios. The effect of the slowly fading channel on the secrecy
capacity of a conventional wire-tap channel is studied in [9], [10]. In these works, it is assumed that the fading is quasi-static
and the transmitter does not know the fading gains. The outage probability, which is the probability that the main channel is
stronger than the eavesdropper’s channel, is defined in these works. In an outage strategy, the transmission rate is fixed and
the information is detected when the instantaneous main channel is stronger than the instantaneous eavesdropper’s channel;
otherwise, either nothing is decoded at the legitimate receiver, or the information is leaked to the eavesdropper. The term
outage capacity refers to the maximum achievable average rate. In [11], a broadcast strategy for the slowly fading Gaussian
point to point channel is introduced. In this strategy, the transmitter uses a layered coding scheme and the receiver is viewed
as a continuum of ordered users.
In [15], the wire-tap channel is extended to the parallel broadcast channels and also to the fading channels with multiple
receivers. In [15], the secrecy constraint is a perfect equivocation for each of the messages, even if all the other messages are
revealed to the eavesdropper. The secrecy sum capacity for a reverse broadcast channel is derived subject to this restrictive
assumption. The notion of the wire-tap channel is also extended to multiple access channels [16]–[19], relay channels [20]–[23],
parallel channels [24] and Multiple-Input Multiple-Output channels [25]–[31]. Some other related works on the communication
of confidential messages can be found in [32]–[36].
In this paper, we consider a scenario where a source node wishes to broadcast two confidential messages to two receivers,
while a wire-tapper also receives the transmitted signal. This model is motivated by wireless communications, where individual
secure messages are broadcast over shared media and can be received by any illegitimate receiver. In fact, we simplify the
restrictive constraint imposed in [15] and assume that the eavesdropper does not have access to the other messages. We first
study the general broadcast channel with an eavesdropper. We present an achievable rate region for this channel. Our achievable
coding scheme is based on a combination of random binning and the Gelfand-Pinsker binning [37]. This scheme matches the
Marton’s inner bound [38] on the broadcast channel without confidentiality constraint. We further study the situation where the
channels are physically degraded and characterize the corresponding secrecy capacity region. Our achievable coding scheme is
based on Cover’s superposition coding [39] and random binning. We refer to this scheme as the Secret Superposition Coding.
This capacity region matches the capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel without any security constraint. It also
matches the secrecy capacity of the wire-tap channel. We also characterize the secrecy capacity region when the channels are
additive white Gaussian noise. We show that the secret superposition of Gaussian codebooks is the optimal choice. Based on
the rate characterization of the secure broadcast channel, we then use broadcast strategy for the slow fading wire-tap channel
when only the eavesdropper’s channel is fixed and known at the transmitter. In broadcast strategy, a source node sends secure
layers of coding and the receiver is viewed as a continuum of ordered users. We derive optimum power allocation for the
layers which maximizes the total average rate.
In [40], we published a conference version of this work where the achievable rate region of the general broadcast channel
with an eavesdropper and the secrecy capacity region of the degraded one were addressed. However, we later became aware
that reference [41], [42] had considered a similar model as used in this paper and had independently characterized the secrecy
capacity region of the broadcast channel (when the channels are degraded). They also generalized their results to the parallel
degraded broadcast channel with an eavesdropper. Independently and parallel to our work, reference [43] considered the
Gaussian broadcast channel with an eavesdropper and characterized its capacity region. Authors of [43] provided two methods
for their converse proof. The first one uses the alternative representation of the mutual information as an integration of the
minimum-mean-square-error (MMSE), as well as the properties of the MMSE. The second one uses the relationship between
the differential entropy and the Fisher information via the de Bruin identity, along with the properties of the Fisher information.
In this work, however, we use Costa’s entropy power inequality to provide the converse proof.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section II we introduce the system model. In section III we provide an
inner bound on the secrecy capacity region when the channels are not degraded. In section IV we specialize our channel to the
degraded ones and establish the secrecy capacity region. In section V we derive the secrecy capacity region when the channels
are AWGN. Based on the secrecy capacity region of the AWGN channel, in section VI we use a broadcast strategy for the
slow fading wire-tap channel when the transmitter only knows the eavesdropper’s channel. Finally, section VII concludes the
paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, random variables are denoted by capital letters (e.g. X) and their realizations are denoted by corresponding
lower case letters (e.g. x). The finite alphabet of a random variable is denoted by a script letter (e.g. X ) and its probability
distribution is denoted by P (x). The vectors will be written as xn = (x1, x2, ..., xn), where subscripted letters denote the
components and superscripted letters denote the vector. Bold capital letters represent matrices (e.g. A). The notation xi−1
denotes the vector (x1, x2, ..., xi−1) and the notation x˜i denotes the vector (xi, xi+1, ..., xn). A similar notation will be used
for random variables and random vectors.
Consider a Broadcast Channel with an eavesdropper (BCE) as depicted in Fig. 1. In this confidential setting, the transmitter
wishes to send two independent messages (W1,W2) to the respective receivers in n uses of the channel and prevent the
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Fig. 1. Broadcast Channel with an Eavesdropper
eavesdropper from having any information about the messages. A discrete memoryless broadcast channel with an eavesdropper
is represented by (X , P,Y1,Y2,Z) where, X is the finite input alphabet set, Y1, Y2 and Z are three finite output alphabet sets,
and P is the channel transition probability P (y1, y2, z|x). The input of the channel is xn ∈ Xn and the outputs are yn1 ∈ Yn1 ,
yn2 ∈ Yn2 , and zn ∈ Zn for Receiver 1, Receiver 2, and the eavesdropper, respectively. The channel is discrete memoryless in
the sense that
P (yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
P (y1,i, y2,i, zi|xi). (1)
A ((2nR1 , 2nR2), n) code for a broadcast channel with an eavesdropper consists of a stochastic encoder
f : ({1, 2, ..., 2nR1} × {1, 2, ..., 2nR2})→ Xn, (2)
and two decoders,
g1 : Yn1 → {1, 2, ..., 2nR1} (3)
and
g2 : Yn2 → {1, 2, ..., 2nR2}. (4)
The average probability of error is defined as the probability that the decoded messages are not equal to the transmitted
messages; that is,
P (n)e = P (g1(Y
n
1 ) 6= W1 ∪ g2(Y n2 ) 6= W2). (5)
The knowledge that the eavesdropper can extract about W1 and W2 from its received signal Zn is measured by
I(Zn,W1) = H(W1)−H(W1|Zn), (6)
I(Zn,W2) = H(W2)−H(W2|Zn), (7)
and
I(Zn, (W1,W2)) = H(W1,W2)−H(W1,W2|Zn). (8)
Perfect secrecy revolves around the idea that the eavesdropper should not obtain any information about the transmitted messages.
Perfect secrecy thus requires that
I(Zn,W1) = 0⇔ H(W1) = H(W1|Zn),
I(Zn,W2) = 0⇔ H(W2) = H(W2|Zn),
and
I(Zn, (W1,W2)) = 0⇔ H(W1,W2) = H(W1,W2|Zn).
where n → ∞. The secrecy levels of confidential messages W1 and W2 are measured at the eavesdropper in terms of
equivocation rates which are defined as follows:
Definition 1 The equivocation rates Re1, Re2 and Re12 for the broadcast channel with an eavesdropper are:
Re1 =
1
n
H(W1|Zn),
Re2 =
1
n
H(W2|Zn),
Re12 =
1
n
H(W1,W2|Zn).
4The perfect secrecy rates R1 and R2 are the amount of information that can be sent to the legitimate receivers in a reliable
and confidential manner.
Definition 2 A secrecy rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0, ǫ1 > 0, ǫ2 > 0, ǫ3 > 0, there exists a
sequence of ((2nR1 , 2nR2), n) codes, such that for sufficiently large n, we have:
P (n)e ≤ ǫ, (9)
Re1≥ R1 − ǫ1, (10)
Re2≥ R2 − ǫ2, (11)
Re12≥ R1 +R2 − ǫ3. (12)
In the above definition, the first condition concerns the reliability, while the other conditions guarantee perfect secrecy for each
individual message and the combination of the two messages, respectively. Since the messages are independent of each other,
the conditions of (10) and (12) or (11) and (12) are sufficient to provide perfect secrecy. The capacity region is defined as
follows.
Definition 3 The capacity region of the broadcast channel with an eavesdropper is the closure of the set of all achievable
rate pairs (R1, R2).
III. ACHIEVABLE RATES FOR GENERAL BCE
In this section, we consider the general broadcast channel with an eavesdropper and present an achievable rate region. Our
achievable coding scheme is based on a combination of the random binning, superposition coding, rate splitting, and Gelfand-
Pinsker binning schemes [37]. Our binning approach is supplemented with superposition coding to accommodate the common
message. We call this scheme the Secret Superposition Scheme. An additional binning is introduced for the confidentiality of
private messages. We note that these double binning techniques have been used by various authors for secret communication
(see e.g. [5], [7]). The following theorem illustrates the achievable rate region for this channel.
Theorem 1 Let RI denote the union of all non-negative rate pairs (R0, R1, R2) satisfying
R0≤ min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)} − I(U ;Z),
R1 +R0≤ I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) + min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)} − I(U ;Z),
R2 +R0≤ I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) + min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)} − I(U ;Z),
R1 +R2 +R0≤ I(V1;Y1|U) + I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U)− I(V1;V2|U) + min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)} − I(U ;Z),
over all joint distributions P (u)P (v1, v2|u)P (x|v1, v2)P (y1, y2, z|x). Any rate pair (R0, R1, R2) ∈ RI is then achievable for
the broadcast channel with an eavesdropper and with common information.
Please see Appendix I for the proof.
Remark 1 If we remove the secrecy constraints by removing the eavesdropper, the above rate region becomes Marton’s
achievable region with common information for the general broadcast channel.
Remark 2 If we remove one of the users, e.g. user 2 and the common message, then we get Csiszar and Korner’s secrecy
capacity for the other user.
IV. THE CAPACITY REGION OF THE DEGRADED BCE
In this section, we consider the degraded broadcast channel with an eavesdropper and establish its secrecy capacity region.
Definition 4 A broadcast channel with an eavesdropper is said to be physically degraded, if X → Y1 → Y2 → Z forms a
Markov chain. In other words, we have
P (y1, y2, z|x) = P (y1|x)P (y2|y1)P (z|y2).
Definition 5 A broadcast channel with an eavesdropper is said to be stochastically degraded if its conditional marginal
distributions are the same as that of a physically degraded broadcast channel, i.e., if there exist two distributions P ′(y2|y1)
and P ′(z|y2), such that
5P (y2|x)=
∑
y1
P (y1|x)P ′(y2|y1),
P (z|x)=
∑
y2
P (y2|x)P ′(z|y2).
Lemma 1 The secrecy capacity region of a broadcast channel with an eavesdropper depends only on the conditional marginal
distributions P (y1|x), P (y2|x) and P (z|x).
Proof: It suffices to show that the error probability of P (n)e and the equivocations of H(W1|Zn), H(W2|Zn) and
H(W1,W2|Zn) are only functions of the marginal distributions when we use the same codebook and encoding schemes. Note
that
max{P (n)e,1 , P (n)e,2 } ≤ P (n)e ≤ P (n)e,1 + P (n)e,2 .
Hence, P (n)e is small if, and only if, both P (n)e,1 and P
(n)
e,2 are small. On the other hand, for a given codebook and encoding
scheme, the decoding error probabilities P (n)e,1 and P
(n)
e,2 and the equivocation rates depend only on marginal channel probability
densities PY1|X , PY2|X and PZ|X . Thus, the same code and encoding scheme gives the same P
(n)
e and equivocation rates.
In the following theorem, we fully characterize the capacity region of the physically degraded broadcast channel with an
eavesdropper.
Theorem 2 The capacity region for transmitting independent secret information over the degraded broadcast channel is the
convex hull of the closure of all (R1, R2) satisfying
R1≤ I(X ;Y1|U)− I(X ;Z|U), (13)
R2≤ I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z), (14)
for some joint distribution P (u)P (x|u)P (y1, y2, z|x).
Please refer to Appendix II for the proof.
Remark 3 If we remove the secrecy constraints by removing the eavesdropper, then the above theorem becomes the capacity
region of the degraded broadcast channel.
The coding scheme is based on Cover’s superposition coding and random binning. We refer to this scheme as the Secure
Superposition Coding scheme. The available resources at the encoder are used for two purposes: to confuse the eavesdropper
so that perfect secrecy can be achieved for both layers, and to transmit the messages into the main channels. To satisfy
confidentiality, the randomization used in the first layer is fully exploited in the second layer. This makes an increase of
I(U ;Z) in the bound of R1.
Remark 4 As Lemma 2 bounds the secrecy rates for the general broadcast channel with an eavesdropper then, Theorem 2 is
true when only the legitimate receivers are degraded.
V. CAPACITY REGION OF GAUSSIAN BCE
In this section, we consider the Gaussian Broadcast Channel with an Eavesdropper (G-BCE). Note that optimizing (13) and
(14) for AWGN channels involves solving a nonconvex functional. Usually nontrivial techniques and strong inequalities are used
to solve the optimization problems of this type. In [3], Leung-Yan-Cheong successfully evaluated the capacity expression of the
wire-tap channel by using the entropy power inequality [44], [45]. Alternatively, it can also be evaluated using a classical result
from the Estimation Theory and the relationship between mutual information and minimum mean-squared error estimation.
On the other hand, the entropy power inequality is sufficient to establish the converse proof of a Gaussian broadcast channel
without secrecy constraint. Unfortunately, the traditional entropy power inequality does not extend to the secure multi-user
case. Here, by using Costa’s version of the entropy power inequality, we show that secret superposition coding with Gaussian
codebook is optimal.
Figure 2 shows the channel model. At time i the received signals are Y1i = Xi+N1i, Y2i = Xi+N2i and Zi = Xi+N3i,
where Nji is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and V ar(Nji) = σ2j for j = 1, 2, 3. Here σ21 ≤ σ22 ≤ σ23 . Assume
that the transmitted power is limited to E[X2] ≤ P . Since the channels are degraded, the received signals can alternatively be
written as Y1i = Xi+N1i, Y2i = Y1i+N
′
2i and Zi = Y2i+N
′
3i, where N1i’s are i.i.d N (0, σ21), N
′
2i’s are i.i.d N (0, σ22−σ21),
and N ′3i’s are i.i.d N (0, σ23 − σ22). Fig. 3 shows the equivalent channels for the G-BCE. The following theorem illustrates the
secrecy capacity region of G-BCE.
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Theorem 3 The secrecy capacity region of the G-BCE is given by the set of rates pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1≤ C
(
αP
σ21
)
− C
(
αP
σ23
)
, (15)
R2≤ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1 − α)P
αP + σ23
)
. (16)
for some α ∈ [0, 1].
Please see Appendix III for the proof.
Figure 4 shows the capacity region of a degraded Gaussian broadcast channel with and without secrecy constraint. In this
figure P = 20, N1 = 0.9, N2 = 1.5 and N3 = 4.
VI. A MULTILEVEL CODING APPROACH TO THE SLOWLY FADING WIRE-TAP CHANNEL
In this section, we use the secure degraded broadcast channel from the previous section to develop a new broadcast strategy
for a slow fading wire-tap channel. This strategy aims to maximize the average achievable rate where the main channel
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state information is not available at the transmitter. By assuming that there is an infinite number of ordered receivers which
correspond to different channel realizations, we propose a secret multilevel coding scheme that maximizes the underlying
objective function. First, some preliminaries and definitions are given, and then the proposed multilevel coding scheme is
described. Here, we follow the steps of the broadcast strategy for the slowly fading point-to-point channel of [11]. This method
is used in several other papers; see, e.g, [12]–[14].
A. Channel Model
Consider a wire-tap channel as depicted in Fig.5. The transmitter wishes to communicate with the destination in the presence
of an eavesdropper. At time i, the signal received by the destination and the eavesdropper are given as follows
Yi = hMXi +N1i (17)
Zi = hEXi +N2i
where Xi is the transmitted symbol and hM , hE are the fading coefficients from the source to the legitimate receiver and to
the eavesdropper, respectively. The fading power gains of the main and eavesdropper channels are given by s = |hM |2 and
s
′
= |hE |2, respectively. N1i, N2i are the additive noise samples, which are Gaussian i.i.d with zero mean and unit variance.
We assume that the channels are slowly fading, and also assume that the transmitter knows only channel state information of
the eavesdropper channel. A motivation for this assumption is that when both channels are unknown at the transmitter, we
assume that s′ = |hE |2 denotes the best-case eavesdropper channel gain. For each realization of hM there is an achievable
rate. Since the transmitter has no information about the main channel and the channels are slowly fading, then the system
is non-ergodic. Here, we are interested in the average rate for various independent transmission blocks. The average shall be
calculated over the distribution of hM .
B. The Secret Multilevel Coding Approach
An equivalent broadcast channel for our channel is depicted in Fig. 6. wherein the transmitter sends an infinite number of
8secure layers of coded information. The receiver is equivalent to a continuum of ordered users. For each channel realization
hkM with the fading power gain sk, the information rate is R(sk, s
′
). We drop the superscript k, and the realization of the
fading power random variable S is denoted by s. Therefore, the transmitter views the main channel as a secure degraded
Gaussian broadcast channel with an infinite number of receivers. The result of the previous section for the two receivers can
easily be extended to an arbitrary number of users. According to theorem 3, the incremental differential secure rate is then
given by
dR(s, s
′
) =
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
sρ(s)ds
1 + sI(s)
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
s
′
ρ(s)ds
1 + s′I(s)
)]+
, (18)
where ρ(s)ds is the transmit power of a layer parameterized by s, intended for receiver s. As log(1 + x) ≈ x for x ≤ 1 then
the log function may be discarded. The function I(s) represents the interference noise of the receivers indexed by u > s which
cannot be canceled at receiver s. The interference at receiver s is therefore given by
I(s) =
∫ ∞
s
ρ(u)d(u). (19)
The total transmitted power is the summation of the power assigned to the layers
P = I(0) =
∫ ∞
0
ρ(u)d(u). (20)
The total achievable rate for a fading realization s is an integration of the incremental rates over all receivers, which can
successfully decode the respective layer
R(s, s
′
) =
1
2
∫ s
0
[
uρ(u)du
1 + uI(u)
− s
′
ρ(u)du
1 + s′I(u)
]+
. (21)
Our goal is to maximize the total average rate over all fading realizations with respect to the power distribution ρ(s) (or
equivalently, with respect to I(u), u ≥ 0) under the power constraint of 20. The optimization problem may be written as
Rmax= max
I(u)
∫ ∞
0
R(u, s
′
)f(u)du, (22)
s.t
P= I(0) =
∫ ∞
0
ρ(u)d(u),
where f(u) is the probability distribution function (pdf) of the power gain S. Noting that the cumulative distribution function
(cdf) is F (u) = ∫ u0 f(a)da, the optimization problem may be written as
Rmax=
1
2
max
I(u)
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (u))G(u)du, (23)
s.t
P= I(0) =
∫ ∞
0
ρ(u)d(u),
where G(u) =
[
u
1+uI(u) − s
′
1+s′I(u)
]+
ρ(u). Note that ρ(u) = −I ′(u). Therefore, the functional in (23) may be written as
J(x, I(x), I
′
(x)) =
−(1− F (x))
[
x
1 + xI(x)
− s
′
1 + s′I(x)
]+
I
′
(x). (24)
The necessary condition for the maximization of an integral of J over x is
JI − d
dx
JI′ = 0, (25)
where JI means the derivation of function J with respect to I , and similarly JI′ is the derivation of J with respect to I
′
.
After some manipulations, the optimum I(x) is given by
I(x) =
{
1−F (x)−(x−s′)f(x)
s
′ (1−F (x))+x(x−s′)f(x) , max{s
′
, x0} ≤ x ≤ x1;
0, otherwise,
where x0 is determined by I(x0) = P , and x1 by I(x1) = 0.
9As a special case, consider the Rayleigh flat fading channel. The random variable S is exponentially distributed with
f(s) = e−s, F (s) = 1− e−s, s ≥ 0. (26)
Substituting f(s) and F (s) into the optimum I(s) and taking the derivative with respect to the fading power s yields the
following optimum transmitter power policy
ρ(s) = − d
ds
I(s) =
{
−s2+2(s′+1)s−s′2
(s2−s′s+s′ )2 , max{s
′
, s0} ≤ s ≤ s1;
0, otherwise,
where s0 is the solution of the equation I(s0) = P , which is
s0 =
−1 + Ps′ +√P 2s′2 + 2P (1− 2P )s′ + 4P + 1
2P
,
and s1 is determined by I(s1) = 0, which is
s1 = 1 + s
′
.
VII. CONCLUSION
A generalization of the wire-tap channel in the case of two receivers and one eavesdropper was considered. We established an
inner bound for the general (non-degraded) case. This bound matches Marton’s bound on broadcast channels without security
constraint. Furthermore, we considered the scenario in which the channels are degraded. We established the perfect secrecy
capacity region for this case. The achievability coding scheme is a secret superposition scheme where randomization in the
first layer helps the secrecy of the second layer. The converse proof combines the converse proof for the degraded broadcast
channel without security constraint, and the perfect secrecy constraint. We proved that the secret superposition scheme with the
Gaussian codebook is optimal in AWGN-BCE. The converse proof is based on Costa’s entropy power inequality and Csiszar
lemma. Based on the rate characterization of the AWGN-BCE, the broadcast strategy for the slowly fading wire-tap channel
were used. In this strategy, the transmitter only knows the eavesdropper’s channel and the source node sends secure layered
coding. The receiver is viewed as a continuum of ordered users. We derived the optimum power allocation for the layers,
which maximizes the total average rate.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We split the private message W1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR1} into W11 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR11} and W10 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR10}, and W2 ∈
{1, 2, ..., 2nR2} into W22 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR22} and W20 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR20}, respectively. W11 and W22 are only to be decoded
by the intended receivers, while W10 and W20 are to be decoded by both receivers. Now, we combine (W10,W20,W0) into a
single auxiliary variable U . The messages W11 and W22 are represented by auxiliary variables V1 and V2, respectively. Here,
R10 +R11 = R1 and R20 +R22 = R2.
1) Codebook Generation: The structure of the encoder is depicted in Fig.7. Fix P (u), P (v1|u), P (v2|u) and P (x|v1, v2).
The stochastic encoding is as follows. Define
L11= I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z, V2|U),
L12= I(V1;Z|V2, U),
L21= I(V2;Z|V1, U)
L22= I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z, V1|U),
L3= I(V1;V2|U)− ǫ,
Note that,
L11 + L12 + L3= I(V1;Y1|U)− ǫ,
L22 + L21 + L3= I(V2;Y2|U)− ǫ,
We first prove the case where
R11≥ L11 ≥ 0, (27)
R22≥ L22 ≥ 0. (28)
Generate 2n(R10+R20+R0) independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) sequences un(k) with k ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2R10+R20+R0}, ac-
cording to the distribution P (un) =
∏n
i=1 P (ui). For each codeword un(k), generate 2L11+L12+L3 i.i.d codewords vn1 (i, i
′
, i
′′
),
with i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nL11}, i′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nL12} and i′′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nL3}, according to P (vn1 |un) =
∏n
i=1 P (v1i|ui). The
indexing presents an alternative interpretation of binning. Randomly distribute these sequences of vn1 into 2nL11 bins indexed
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Fig. 7. The Stochastic Encoder
by i, for the codewords in each bin, randomly distribute them into 2nL12 sub-bins indexed by i′ ; thus i′′ is the index for the
codeword in each sub-bin. Similarly, for each codeword un, generate 2L21+L22+L3 i.i.d codewords vn2 (j, j
′
, j
′′
) according to
P (vn2 |un) =
∏n
i=1 P (v2i|ui), where j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nL21}, j
′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nL22} and j′′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nL3}.
2) Encoding: To send messages (w10, w20, w0), we calculate the corresponding message index k and choose the corresponding
codeword un(k). Given this un(k), there exists 2n(L11+L12+L3) codewords of vn1 (i, i
′
, i
′′
) to choose from for representing
message w11. Evenly map 2nR11 messages w11 to 2nL11 bins, then, given (27), each bin corresponds to at least one message
w11. Thus, given w11, the bin index i can be decided.
1) If R11 ≤ L11+L12, each bin corresponds to 2n(R11−L11) messages w11. Evenly place the 2nL12 sub-bins into 2n(R11−L11)
cells. For each given w11, we can find the corresponding cell,then, we randomly choose a sub-bin from that cell, thus
the sub-bin index i′ can be decided. The codeword vn1 (i, i
′
.i
′′
) will be chosen properly from that sub-bin.
2) If L11 + L12 ≤ R11 ≤ L11 + L12 + L3, then each sub-bin is mapped to at least one message w11, therefore, given
w11, i
′
cab be decided. In each sub-bin, there are 2n(R11−L11−L12) messages. The codeword vn1 (i, i
′
.i
′′
) will be chosen
randomly and properly from that sub-bin.
Given w22, we select vn2 (j, j
′
, j
′′
) in the exact same manner. From the given sub-bins , the encoder chooses the codeword
pair (vn1 (i, i
′
, i
′′
), vn2 (j, j
′
, j
′′
)) that satisfies the following property,
(vn1 (i, i
′
, i
′′
), vn2 (j, j
′
, j
′′
)) ∈ A(n)ǫ (V1, V2, U)
where A(n)ǫ (U, V1, V2) denotes the set of jointly typical sequences un, vn1 , and vn2 with respect to P (u, v1, v2). If there is more
than one such pair, the transmitter randomly chooses one; if there is no such pair, an error is declared.
Given vn1 and vn2 , the channel input xn is generated i.i.d. according to the distribution P (xn|vn1 , vn2 ) =
∏n
i=1 P (xi|v1i, v2i).
3) Decoding: The received signals at the legitimate receivers, yn1 and yn2 , are the outputs of the channels P (yn1 |xn) =∏n
i=1 P (y1,i|xi) and P (yn2 |xn) =
∏n
i=1 P (y2,i|xi), respectively. The first receiver looks for the unique sequence un(k) such
that
(un(k), yn1 ) ∈ A(n)ǫ (U, Y1).
If such un(k) exists and is unique, set kˆ = k; otherwise, declare an error. Upon decoding k, this receiver looks for sequences
vn1 (i, i
′
, i
′′
) such that
(vn1 (i, i
′
, i
′′
), un(k), yn1 ) ∈ A(n)ǫ (V1, U, Y1).
If such vn1 (i, i
′
, i
′′
) exists and is unique, set iˆ = i, iˆ′ = i′ , and iˆ′′ = i′′ ; otherwise, declare an error. Using the values of kˆ, iˆ, iˆ′
and iˆ′′ , the decoder can calculate the message indices wˆ0, wˆ10 and wˆ11. The decoding for the second decoder is similar.
4) Error Probability Analysis: Since the region of RI is a subset of the Marton’s region, then the error probability analysis
is the same as [38].
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5) Equivocation Calculation: To meet the secrecy requirements, we need to prove that the common message W0, the
combination of (W0,W1), the combination of (W0,W2), and the combination of (W0,W1,W2) are perfectly secured. The
proof of secrecy requirement for the message W0 is straightforward and is therefore omitted.
To prove the secrecy requirement for (W0,W1), we have
nRe10 = H(W1,W0|Zn)
= H(W1,W0, Z
n)−H(Zn)
= H(W1,W0, U
n, V n1 , Z
n)−H(Un, V n1 |W1,W0, Zn)−H(Zn)
= H(W1,W0, U
n, V n1 ) +H(Z
n|W1,W0, Un, V n1 )−H(Un|W1,W0, Zn)−H(V n1 |W1,W0, Zn, Un)−H(Zn)
(a)
≥ H(W1,W0, Un, V n1 ) +H(Zn|W1,W0, Un, V n1 )− nǫn −H(Zn)
(b)
= H(W1,W0, U
n, V n1 ) +H(Z
n|Un, V n1 )− nǫn −H(Zn)
(c)
≥ H(Un, V n1 ) +H(Zn|Un, V n1 )− nǫn −H(Zn)
= H(Un) +H(V n1 |Un)− I(Un, V n1 ;Zn)− nǫn
(d)
≥ min{I(Un;Y n1 ), I(Un;Y n2 )}+ I(V n1 ;Y n1 |Un)− I(V n1 ;Zn|Un)− I(Un;Zn)− nǫn
(e)
≥ nR1 + nR0 − nǫn,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality that bounds the term H(Un|W1,W0, Zn) ≤ h(P (n)we0) + nPnwe0Rw0 ≤ nǫn/2 and
the term H(V n1 |W1,W0, Zn, Un) ≤ h(P (n)we1) + nPnwe1Rw1 ≤ nǫn/2 for sufficiently large n. Here Pnwe0 and Pnwe1 denotes the
wiretapper’s error probability of decoding un and V n1 in the case that the bin numbers w0 and w1 are known to the eavesdropper,
respectively. The eavesdropper first looks for the unique un in bin w0 of the first layer, such that it is jointly typical with zn.
As the number of candidate codewords is small enough, the probability of error is arbitrarily small for a sufficiently large n.
Next, given un, the eavesdropper looks for the unique vn1 in the bin w1 which is jointly typical with zn. Similarly, since the
number of available candidates is small enough, then the probability of decoding error is arbitrarily small. (b) follows from the
fact that (W1,W0) → Un → V n1 → Zn forms a Markov chain. Therefore, we have I(W1,W0;Zn|Un, V n1 ) = 0, where it is
implied that H(Zn|W1,W0, Un, V n1 ) = H(Zn|Un, V n1 ). (c) follows from the fact that H(W1,W0, Un, Xn) ≥ H(Un, Xn).
(d) follows from that fact that H(Un) ≥ min{I(Un;Y n1 ), I(Un;Y n2 )} and H(V n1 |Un) ≥ I(V n1 ;Y n1 |Un). (e) follows from
Lemma 4 of the appendix IV.
By using the same approach it is easy to show that,
nRe20 = H(W2,W0|Zn)
≥ nR2 + nR0 − nǫn.
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Therefore, we only need to prove that (W0,W1,W2) is perfectly secured; we have
nRe120 = H(W1,W2,W0|Zn)
= H(W1,W2,W0, Z
n)−H(Zn)
= H(W1,W2,W0, U
n, V n1 , V
n
2 , Z
n)−H(Un, V n1 , V n2 |W1,W2,W0, , Zn)−H(Zn)
= H(W1,W2,W0, U
n, V n1 , V
n
2 ) +H(Z
n|W1,W2,W0, Un, V n1 , V n2 )−H(Un, V n1 , V n2 |W1,W2,W0, Zn)
− H(Zn)
(a)
≥ H(W1,W2,W0, Un, V n1 , V n2 ) +H(Zn|W1,W2,W0, Un, V n1 , V n2 )− nǫn −H(Zn)
(b)
= H(W1,W2,W0, U
n, V n1 , V
n
2 ) +H(Z
n|Un, V n1 , V n2 )− nǫn −H(Zn)
(c)
≥ H(Un, V n1 , V n2 ) +H(Zn|Un, V n1 , V n2 )− nǫn −H(Zn)
(d)
= H(Un) +H(V n1 |Un) +H(V n2 |Un)− I(V n1 ;V n2 |Un) +H(Zn|Un, V n1 , V n2 )− nǫn −H(Zn)
(e)
≥ min{I(Un;Y n1 ), I(Un;Y n2 )}+ I(V n1 ;Y n1 |Un) + I(V n2 ;Y n2 |Un)− I(V n1 ;V n2 |Un)− I(Un, V n1 , V n2 ;Zn)
− nǫn
(f)
≥ min{I(Un;Y n1 ), I(Un;Y n2 )}+ I(V n1 ;Y n1 |Un) + I(V n2 ;Y n2 |Un)− I(V n1 ;V n2 |Un)− I(V n1 , V n2 ;Zn|Un)
− I(Un;Zn)− nǫn
(g)
≥ nmin{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)}+ nI(V1;Y1|U) + nI(V2;Y2|U)− nI(V1;V2|U)− nI(V1, V2;Z|U)
− nI(U ;Z)− nǫn
≥ nR1 + nR2 + nR0 − nǫn,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, which states that for sufficiently large n, H(Un, V n1 , V n2 |W1,W2,W0, Zn) ≤
h(P
(n)
we ) +nPnweRw ≤ nǫn. Here Pnwe denotes the wiretapper’s error probability of decoding (un, vn1 , vn2 ) in the case that
the bin numbers w0, w1, and w2 are known to the eavesdropper. Since the sum rate is small enough, then Pnwe → 0
for sufficiently large n. (b) follows from the following Markov chain: (W1,W2,W0) → (Un, V n1 , V n2 ) → Zn. Hence, we
have H(Zn|W1,W2,W0, Un, V n1 , V n2 ) = H(Zn|Un, V n1 , V n2 ). (c) follows from the fact that H(W1,W2,W0, Un, V n1 , V n2 ) ≥
H(Un, V n1 , V
n
2 ). (d) follows from that fact that H(Un, V n1 , V n2 ) = H(Un) +H(V n1 |Un) +H(V n2 |Un)− I(V n1 ;V n2 |Un). (e)
follows from the fact that H(Un) ≥ min{I(Un;Y n1 ), I(Un;Y n2 )} and H(V ni |Un) ≥ I(V ni ;Y ni |Un) for i = 1, 2. (f) follows
from the fact that I(Un, V n1 , V n2 ;Zn) = I(Un;Zn) + I(V n1 , V n2 ;Zn|Un). (g) follows from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 in the
appendix IV. This completes the achievability proof.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Achievablity: We need to show that the region of (13) and (14) is a subset of the achievability region of Theorem 1. In the
achievability scheme of Theorem 1, if we set W2 = ∅ and rename W0 with W2, then using the degradedness, we obtain the
following region,
R1 +R2≤ I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Z|U) + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z), (29)
R2≤ I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z).
Note that since the first receiver decodes both messages, the total rate of this receiver is R1 ← R1 +R2 and we have
R1≤ I(UV ;Y1|U) + I(U ;Y2)− I(UV ;Z), (30)
R2≤ I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z).
Now, since U → V → X → Y2 → Z is a markov chain, then the following region is a subset of the above region, and
consequently, it is achievable,
R1≤ I(X ;Y1|U) + I(U ;Z)− I(X ;Z), (31)
R2≤ I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z).
which is the same as that of region (13) and (14). This completes the achievability proof.
Converse: The transmitter sends two independent secret messages W1 and W2 to Receiver 1 and Receiver 2, respectively. Let
us define Ui = (W2, Y i−11 ). The following Lemma bounds the secrecy rates for a general case of (W1,W2)→ Xn → Y n1 Y n2 Zn:
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Lemma 2 For the broadcast channel with an eavesdropper, the perfect secrecy rates are bounded as follows,
nR1≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1i|W2, Zi, Y i−11 , Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3,
nR2≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2i|Zi, Y i−12 , Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ2.
Proof: We need to prove the second bound. The first bound can similarly be proven. nR2 is bounded as follows:
nR2
(a)
≤ H(W2|Zn) + nǫ2
(b)
≤ H(W2|Zn)−H(W2|Y n2 ) + nδ1 + nǫ2
= I(W2;Y
n
2 )− I(W2;Zn) + nδ1 + nǫ2
where (a) follows from the secrecy constraint that H(W2|Zn) ≥ H(W2) − nǫ2. (b) follows from Fano’s inequality that
H(W2|Y n2 ) ≤ nδ1. Next, we expand I(W2;Y n2 ) and I(W2;Zn) as follows.
I(W2;Y
n
2 ) =
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2i|Y i−12 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2, Z˜
i+1;Y2i|Y i−12 )− I(Z˜i+1;Y2i|W2, Y i−12 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2i|Y i−12 , Z˜i+1) + I(Z˜i+1;Y2i|Y i−12 )− I(Z˜i+1;Y2i|W2, Y i−12 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2i|Y i−12 , Z˜i+1) + ∆1 −∆2,
where, ∆1 =
∑n
i=1 I(Z˜
i+1;Y2i|Y i−12 ) and ∆2 =
∑n
i=1 I(Z˜
i+1;Y2i|W2, Y i−12 ). Similarly, we have,
I(W2;Z
n) =
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Zi|Z˜i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2, Y
i−1
2 ;Zi|Z˜i+1)− I(Y i−12 ;Zi|W2, Z˜i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Zi|Y i−12 , Z˜i+1) + I(Y i−12 ;Zi|Z˜i+1)− I(Y i−12 ;Zi|W2, Z˜i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Zi|Y i−12 , Z˜i+1) + ∆∗1 −∆∗2,
where, ∆∗1 =
∑n
i=1 I(Y
i−1
2 ;Zi|Z˜i+1) and ∆∗2 =
∑n
i=1 I(Y
i−1
2 ;Zi|W2, Z˜i+1). According to Lemma 7 of [4], ∆1 = ∆∗1 and
∆2 = ∆
∗
2. Thus, we have,
nR2 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2i|Y i−12 , Z˜i+1)− I(W2;Zi|Y i−12 , Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ2
=
n∑
i=1
H(W2|Zi, Y i−12 , Z˜i+1)−H(W2|Y2i, Y i−12 , Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ2
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(W2|Zi, Y i−12 , Z˜i+1)−H(W2|Y2i, Zi, Y i−12 , Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ2
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2i|Zi, Y i−12 , Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ2,
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning always decreases the entropy.
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Now according to the above Lemma, the secrecy rates are bounded as follows:
nR1
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1,i|W2, Zi, Y i−11 , Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1,i|Ui, Zi, Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i|Ui, Zi, Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i, Ui, Zi|Z˜i+1)− I(Xi;Zi|Z˜i+1)− I(Xi;Ui|Zi, Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i|Ui, Z˜i+1) + I(Xi;Ui|Z˜i+1)− I(Xi;Zi|Z˜i+1)− I(Xi;Ui|Zi, Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i|Ui, Z˜i+1)− I(Xi;Zi|Z˜i+1) + I(Zi;Ui|Z˜i+1)− I(Zi;Ui|Xi, Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i|Ui, Z˜i+1)− I(Xi;Zi|Z˜i+1) + I(Zi;Ui|Z˜i+1) + nδ1 + nǫ3,
where (a) follows from the Lemma (2). (b) follows from the data processing theorem. (c) follows from the chain rule. (d)
follows from the fact that I(Xi;Y1,i, Ui, Zi|Z˜i+1) = I(Xi;Ui|Z˜i+1)+I(Xi;Y1,i|Ui, Z˜i+1)+I(Xi;Zi|Y1,i, Ui, Z˜i+1) and from
the fact that Z˜i+1Ui → Xi → Y1,i → Y2,i → Zi forms a Markov chain, which means that I(Xi;Zi|Y1,i, Ui, Z˜i+1) = 0. (e)
follows from the fact that I(Xi;Ui|Z˜i+1)− I(Xi;Ui|Zi, Z˜i+1) = I(Zi;Ui|Z˜i+1)− I(Zi;Ui|Xi, Z˜i+1). (f) follows from the
fact that Z˜i+1Ui → Xi → Zi forms a Markov chain. Thus, I(Zi;UiZ˜i+1|Xi) = 0 which implies that I(Zi;Ui|Xi, Z˜i+1) = 0.
For the second receiver, we have
nR2
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2,i|Y i−12 , Zi, Z˜i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y2,i|Y i−12 , Zi, Z˜i+1)−H(Y2,i|W2, Y i−12 , Zi, Z˜i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y2,i|Zi, Z˜i+1)−H(Y2,i|W2, Y i−11 , Y i−12 , Zi, Z˜i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y2,i|Zi, Z˜i+1)−H(Y2,i|Ui, Zi, Z˜i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y2,i;Ui|Zi, Z˜i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y2,i;Ui|Z˜i+1) + I(Y2,i;Zi|Ui, Z˜i+1)− I(Y2,i;Zi|Z˜i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y2,i;Ui|Z˜i+1)− I(Zi;Ui|Z˜i+1) + I(Zi;Ui|Y2,i, Z˜i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y2,i;Ui|Z˜i+1)− I(Zi;Ui|Z˜i+1) + nδ2 + nǫ1,
where (a) follows from the lemma (2). (b) follows from the fact that conditioning always decreases the entropy. (c) follows
from the fact that Y i−12 → W2Z˜i+1Y i−11 → Y2i → Zi forms a Markov chain. (d) follows from the fact that Z˜i+1Ui →
Y2,i → Zi forms a Markov chain. Thus I(Zi;UiZ˜i+1|Y2i) = 0 which implies that I(Zi;Ui|Y2i, Z˜i+1) = 0. Now, following
[39], let us define the time sharing random variable Q which is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., n} and independent of
(W1,W2, X
n, Y n1 , Y
n
2 ). Let us define U = UQ, V = (Z˜Q+1, Q), X = XQ, Y1 = Y1,Q, Y2 = Y2,Q, Z = ZQ, then R1 and
R2 can be written as
R1≤ I(X ;Y1|U, V ) + I(U ;Z|V )− I(X ;Z|V ), (32)
R2≤ I(U ;Y2|V )− I(U ;Z|V ). (33)
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Note that the boundary of this region is characterized by the maximization of R1 + µR2 over this region for µ ≥ 1. On the
other hand we have,
R1 + µR2 ≤ I(X ;Y1|U, V ) + I(U ;Z|V )− I(X ;Z|V ) + µ (I(U ;Y2|V )− I(U ;Z|V )) (34)
Since conditional mutual information is the average of the unconditional ones, the largest region is achieved when V is a
constant. This proves the converse part.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Achievability: Let U ∼ N (0, (1 − α)P ) and X ′ ∼ N (0, αP ) be independent and X = U +X ′ ∼ N (0, P ). Now consider
the following secure superposition coding scheme:
1) Codebook Generation: Generate 2nI(U ;Y2) i.i.d Gaussian codewords un with average power (1 − α)P and randomly
distribute these codewords into 2nR2 bins. Then index each bin by w2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR2}. Generate an independent set of
2nI(X
′
;Y1) i.i.d Gaussian codewords x′n with average power αP . Then, randomly distribute them into 2nR1 bins. Index each
bin by w1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR1}.
2) Encoding: To send messages w1 and w2, the transmitter randomly chooses one of the codewords in bin w2, (say un) and
one of the codewords in bin w1 (say x′n ). The transmitter then simply transmits xn = un + x′n.
3) Decoding: The received signal at the legitimate receivers are yn1 and yn2 , respectively. Receiver 2 determines the unique
un such that (un, yn2 ) are jointly typical and declares the index of the bin containing un as the message received. If there is
none of such or more than one of such, an error is declared. Receiver 1 uses the successive cancelation method; it first decodes
un and subtracts it from yn1 and then looks for the unique x
′n such that (x′n, yn1 − un) are jointly typical and declares the
index of the bin containing x′n as the message received.
It can be shown that if R1 and R2 satisfy (15) and (16), the error probability analysis and equivocation calculation is
straightforward and may therefore be omitted.
Converse: According to the previous section, R2 is bounded as follows:
nR2 ≤ I(Y n2 ;Un|Zn) = h(Y n2 |Zn)− h(Y n2 |Un, Zn), (35)
where h is the differential entropy. The classical entropy power inequality states that:
2
2
n
h(Y n
2
+N
′
n
3
) ≥ 2 2nh(Y n2 ) + 2 2nh(N
′
n
3
)
Therefore, h(Y n2 |Zn) may be written as follows:
h(Y n2 |Zn) = h(Zn|Y n2 ) + h(Y n2 )− h(Zn)
=
n
2
log 2πe(σ23 − σ22) + h(Y n2 )− h(Y n2 +N
′n
3 )
≤ n
2
log 2πe(σ23 − σ22) + h(Y n2 )−
n
2
log(2
2
n
h(Y n
2
) + 2πe(σ23 − σ22)).
On the other hand, for any fixed a ∈ R, the function
f(t, a) = t− n
2
log(2
2
n
t + a)
is concave in t and has a global maximum at the maximum value of t. Thus, h(Y n2 |Zn) is maximized when Y n2 (or equivalently
Xn) has Gaussian distribution. Hence,
h(Y n2 |Zn) ≤
n
2
log 2πe(σ23 − σ22) +
n
2
log 2πe(P + σ22)−
n
2
log 2πe(P + σ23)
=
n
2
log
(
2πe(σ23 − σ22)(P + σ22)
P + σ23
)
. (36)
Note that another method to obtain (36) is using the worst additive noise lemma (see [46], [47] for details). Now con-
sider the term h(Y n2 |Un, Zn). This term is lower bounded with h(Y n2 |Un, Xn, Zn) = n2 log 2πe(σ22) which is greater than
n
2 log 2πe(
σ2
2
(σ2
3
−σ2
2
)
σ2
3
). Hence,
n
2
log 2πe(
σ22(σ
2
3 − σ22)
σ23
) ≤ h(Y n2 |Un, Zn) ≤ h(Y n2 |Zn). (37)
Inequalities (36) and (37) imply that there exists an α ∈ [0, 1] such that
h(Y n2 |Un, Zn) =
n
2
log
(
2πe(σ23 − σ22)(αP + σ22)
αP + σ23
)
. (38)
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Substituting (38) and (36) into (35) yields the desired bound
nR2 ≤ h(Y n2 |Zn)− h(Y n2 |Un, Zn)
≤ n
2
log
(
(P + σ22)(αP + σ
2
3)
(P + σ23)(αP + σ
2
2)
)
= nC
(
(1 − α)P
αP + σ22
)
− nC
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ23
)
. (39)
Note that the left hand side of (38) can be written as h(Y n2 , Zn|Un)− h(Zn|Un) which implies that
h(Y n2 |Un)− h(Zn|Un) =
n
2
log
(
αP + σ22
αP + σ23
)
. (40)
Since σ21 ≤ σ22 ≤ σ23 , there exists a 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 such that σ22 = (1 − β)σ21 + βσ23 , or equivalently, σ22 = σ21 + β(σ23 − σ21).
Therefore, since Y n1 → Y n2 → Zn forms a Markov chain, the received signals Zn and Y n2 can be written as Zn = Y n1 + N˜n
and Y n2 = Y n1 +
√
βN˜n where N˜ is an independent Gaussian noise with variance σ˜2 = σ23 − σ21 . All noises are Gaussian
random n-vector with a positive definite covariance matrix. Costa’s entropy power inequality [48] states that (see also [49] for
its linear version),
2
2
n
h(Y n
1
+
√
β eNn|Un) ≥ (1− β)2 2nh(Y n1 |Un) + β2 2nh(Y n1 + eNn|Un) (41)
for any random n-vector Y n1 and Gaussian random n-vector of N˜n. Equivalently we have,
2
2
n
h(Y n
2
|Un) ≥ (1− β)2 2nh(Y n1 |Un) + β2 2nh(Zn|Un) (42)
After some manipulations of (42), we obtain
h(Y n1 |Un)− h(Zn|Un)
≤ n
2
log
(
αP + σ22 − β(αP + σ23)
(1− β)(αP + σ23)
)
=
n
2
log
(
αP + σ21
αP + σ23
)
. (43)
The rate R1 is bounded as follows
nR1 ≤ I(Xn;Y n1 |Un)− I(Xn;Zn) + I(Un;Zn) (44)
= h(Y n1 |Un)− h(Y n1 |Xn, Un) + h(Zn|Xn)− h(Zn|Un)
= h(Y n1 |Un)− h(Zn|Un) +
n
2
log(
σ23
σ21
)
(a)
≤ n
2
log
(
αP + σ21
αP + σ23
σ23
σ21
)
= nC
(
αP
σ21
)
− nC
(
αP
σ23
)
,
where (a) follows from (43).
APPENDIX IV
COMPLEMENTARY LEMMAS FOR EQUIVOCATION ANALYSIS
Lemma 3 Assume Un, V n1 , V n2 and Zn are generated according to the achievablity scheme of Theorem 1, then we have,
I(V n1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Un) ≤ nI(V1, V2;Z|U) + nδ1n,
I(V n1 ;V
n
2 |Un) ≤ nI(V1;V2|U) + nδ2n.
Proof: Let Anǫ (PU,V1,V2,Z) denote the set of typical sequences (Un, V n1 , V n2 , Zn) with respect to PU,V1,V2,Z , and
ζ =
{
1, (Un, V n1 , V
n
2 , Z
n) /∈ Anǫ (PU,V1,V2,Z);
0, otherwise,
be the corresponding indicator function. We expand I(V n1 , V n2 ;Zn|Un) as follow,
I(V n1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Un)≤ I(V n1 , V n2 , ζ;Zn|Un) (45)
= I(V n1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Un, ζ) + I(ζ;Zn|Un)
=
1∑
j=0
P (ζ = j)I(V n1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Un, ζ = j) + I(ζ;Zn|Un).
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According to the joint typicality property, we have
P (ζ = 1)I(V n1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Un, ζ = 1)≤ nP ((Un, V n1 , V n2 , Zn) /∈ Anǫ (PU,V1,V2,Z)) log ‖Z‖ (46)
≤ nǫn log ‖Z‖.
Note that,
I(ζ;Zn|Un) ≤ H(ζ) ≤ 1 (47)
Now consider the term P (ζ = 0)I(V n1 , V n2 ;Zn|Un, ζ = 0). Following the sequence joint typicality properties, we have
P (ζ = 0)I(V n1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Un, ζ = 0)≤ I(V n1 , V n2 ;Zn|Un, ζ = 0) (48)
=
∑
(Un,V n
1
,V n
2
,Zn)∈An
ǫ
P (Un, V n1 , V
n
2 , Z
n)
(
logP (V n1 , V
n
2 , Z
n|Un)− logP (V n1 , V n2 |Un)
− logP (Zn|Un)),
≤ n [−H(V1, V2, Z|U) +H(V1, V2|U) +H(Z|U) + 3ǫn] ,
= n [I(V1, V2;Z|U) + 3ǫn] .
By substituting (46), (47), and (48) into (45), we get the desired reasult,
I(V n1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Un)≤ nI(V1, V2;Z|U) + n
(
ǫn log ‖Z‖+ 3ǫn + 1
n
)
, (49)
= nI(V1, V2;Z|U) + nδ1n,
where,
δ1n = ǫn log ‖Z‖+ 3ǫn + 1
n
.
Following the same steps, one can prove that
I(V n1 ;V
n
2 |Un) ≤ nI(V1;V2|U) + nδ2n. (50)
Using the same approach as in Lemma 3, we can prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 4 Assume Un, V n1 , Y n1 and Y n2 are generated according to the achievablity scheme of Theorem 1, then we have,
I(V n1 ;Y
n
1 |Un) ≤ nI(V1;Y1|U) + nδ3n,
I(V n1 ;Z
n|Un) ≤ nI(V1;Z|U) + nδ4n,
I(Un;Zn) ≤ nI(U ;Z) + nδ5n,
I(Un;Y n1 ) ≤ nI(U ;Y1) + nδ6n
I(Un;Y n2 ) ≤ nI(U ;Y2) + nδ7n
Proof: The steps of the proof are very similar to the steps of proof of Lemma 3 and may be omitted here.
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